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means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary 
authority. We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter 
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1  Introduction
In an important contribution to understanding monetary theory, Barro and Gordon (1983) described a policy 
maker who is unable to make long term policy commitments. By focusing on short term results, it is pos-
sible that the policy maker pursues policies which create surprise inflation. This inflation bias result has 
been explored in numerous empirical studies including Ireland (1999), Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) and others. 
Although Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) showed that the Barro and Gordon style inflation bias is not supported 
by the data, he did show that an inflation bias arising from asymmetric monetary authority preferences is.
One concern with many of the empirical results, is that the parameter estimates reported in the literature 
show a wide range of values with some showing that the asymmetric preference bias hypothesis disappear-
ing over certain sample periods.1 This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia 
(2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature 
could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be moti-
vated through several means. It could arise through a common hypothesis that there is variation in the slope 
of the Phillips curve and/or it could arise because of time variation in both the preferences of the monetary 
planner and the political pressures she faces over time. We show that allowing time variation for the coef-
ficient associated with the conditional unemployment volatility significantly improves the model fit.
Following Ball and Mazumder (2011), we tie the magnitude of the coefficient variation to the vari-
ation in the inflation shocks. We show that for larger coefficient variation settings the mean value of 
the coefficient decreases. Although this implies that the mean value of the coefficient becomes statisti-
cally insignificant, it is important to stress that it does not imply that the asymmetric monetary planner 
1 In a similar framework where central bank preferences depend on output gap volatility instead of unemployment volatility, 
surico (2007) finds that output gap volatility is not important in characterizing inflation bias during the Great Moderation period 
of 1982:4–2002:3.
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preference hypothesis suggested in Ruge-Murcia (2003) is invalid because the time varying parameter is 
still tied to the conditional unemployment variance. What our results do show is that time variation could 
account for the range of parameter estimates tied to the conditional unemployment volatility found in the 
literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. section 2 provides a brief description of the empirical model 
with asymmetric central banker preferences suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003) and the simple extension of 
considering a time varying coefficient associated with the conditional unemployment volatility. section 3 
shows the estimation results and discusses their implications. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2  The empirical model
We begin with a brief review of the asymmetric preference model suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004). 
This model begins with a short run Phillips curve given by
 
λ pi pi η= − − +( ) ,n et t t t tu u  
where ut is observed unemployment at time t, 
n
tu  is the natural rate of unemployment at time t, πt is the infla-
tion rate at time t, piet  is the public’s forecast of inflation at time t constructed at time t–1, and ηt is a supply 
disturbance.
The natural rate of unemployment evolves over time according to
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where ζt is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σζ. Note 
that when δ = 1, the model imposes a unit root process for unemployment while when δ≠1, there is no stochas-
tic trend.
Actual inflation for the period is assumed to be simply determined as the sum of it, the interest rate 
chosen by the monetary authority and a control error, εt, so that
 πt = it+εt, (1)
where εt is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σε. 
Define ξt to be the 3 × 1 vector that contains the model’s structural shocks at time t. It is assumed that 
ξt is serially uncorrelated, normally distributed with zero mean, and (possibly) exhibiting conditional 
heteroskedasticity,
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where Ωt is a 3 × 3 positive-definite variance–covariance matrix. The conditional heteroskedasticity of ξt 
relaxes the more restrictive assumption of constant conditional second moments and captures temporary 
changes in the volatility of the structural shocks.
The policy maker selects it in an effort to minimize a loss function that penalizes variations of unemploy-
ment and inflation around target values according to
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where γ≠0 and φ > 0 are preference parameters, and pi∗t  and ∗tu  are desired rates of inflation and unemploy-
ment, respectively. As in Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003), it is assumed that pi∗t  is a constant denoted 
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by π*. The linex function characterizing unemployment allows for asymmetric preferences on unemploy-
ment by assigning different weights depending on the sign of unemployment deviations from the target.2 In 
particular, for γ > 0 positive unemployment deviations from the target are weighted more than negative ones 
in the monetary authority’s loss function. Also notice that the asymmetric loss function nests the symmetric 
(quadratic) loss function whenever γ goes to zero. Thus, the presence of asymmetric central bank preferences 
over unemployment can be detected by running a test on whether γ is significant.
The unemployment level targeted by the central banker is proportional to the natural rate value according to
 −
∗
= < ≤1 for 0 1.
n
t t tu kE u k  (3)
After some algebra involved with solving the optimization problem faced by the central banker under 
discretion and applying a first order Taylor series expansion to linearize the first order condition, one can 
arrive at the two key econometric equations given by
 
pi σ
−
= + + +21 , ,t t t u t ta bE u c e  
(4)
where a is a constant intercept, b = φλ(1–k) ≥  0, 0,2
c φλγ>= < and et is a reduced form disturbance and
 1 1 1 1 1 1= (1 ) ( ) ( ).t t t t t t t t t tu u u∆ ψ δ θ∆ ζ η λε δ λε η θ λ∆ε ∆η− − − − − −− − + + + − + − + −  (5)
Equations (4) and (5) constitute the system of equations estimated by Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004). sta-
tionary and nonstationary versions of the model can be investigated by placing different restrictions on 
δ. When δ = 1, equation (5) implies that ut is an ARIMA(1,1,2) process, while for δ < 1, ut is an ARIMA(2,0,2) 
process.
The coefficient associated with the conditional unemployment volatility, φλγ= ,
2
c  is a function of three 
deep model parameters characterizing central bank preferences (φ and γ) and the slope of the Phillips curve, 
λ. Any of these parameters may have changed over time. Indeed, the instability of the Phillips curve is a 
recurrent issue in the macroeconomics literature.3 Moreover, the central bank loss function is likely to change 
over time for several reasons ranging from different preferences associated with the alternative Fed chair-
men and changes in the political pressures a Fed chairman faces as a consequence of a changing economic 
environment.4
In order to study empirically the consequences of a changing economic environment on inflation bias, 
we augment the model to include the possibility of c changing over time according to
 ρ −− = − +1( ) .t c t tc c c c w  
We interpret this as a reduced form arising because of time variation in any of the three deep parameters 
entering in c. Although it would be preferable to formulate the time variation from the actual deep parameter 
specification, this is rather complicated because one would need to deal with three different time-varying 
processes. In addition, if there were three fundamental sources of time variation, it would be difficult to 
ensure identification of the additional time-varying process parameters with only two observable variables 
(inflation and unemployment) unless more restrictions, such as those described below, are imposed. That 
2 The linex function was introduced by Varian (1974) in the context of Bayesian econometric analysis. More recently, Nobay and 
Peel (2003) introduced it in the optimal monetary policy analysis.
3 For instance, recent empirical evidence [among others, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), smets and Wouters (2007), Ball and Ma-
zumder (2011)] suggests that the slope of the Phillips curve has decreased in recent decades.
4 see surico (2007, p. 317) for an excellent review of anecdotal evidence found in the literature of the changing political pressures 
faced by the Fed over the post-war period.
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said, it is rather straight forward to see that our formulation could arise in a setting in which the model is 
simply augmented to include a time varying φt.5
Following Ball and Mazumder (2011) we tie the variance of wt to the variance of et.6 In addition to their 
constraint that σ σ= ×2 2100 ,e w  we also consider a ratio of 100,000 to show that this value roughly replicates 
the Ruge-Murcia (2003) estimates. In the tables below, we refer to this ratio of the variances using the nota-
tion r (i.e., σ σ= 2 2/e wr ). Linking the variance of wt and et is important for two main reasons. First, we view the 
shocks, wt, affecting deep parameter stability as relatively small compared to inflation shocks, et. second, 
from an econometric perspective, since we consider two observables (unemployment and inflation) it seems 
reasonable to impose some additional restrictions in order to properly identify the parameters describing the 
three shocks of the model.
3  Estimation results
In this study we consider three sample periods. The first is the full sample period which runs from 1960:1 to 
2011:2. Later we undertake a sensitivity analysis which focuses on two subsamples. The first subsample is 
the period 1960:1–1999:4, which is a popular data interval that has been used by numerous people, includ-
ing Ireland (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003). The second subsample considers the so-called Great Moderation 
period, when most macroeconomic variables exhibit a much lower volatility than before or after the period. 
The analysis of the Great Moderation period is of interest because some authors, such as surico (2007), have 
challenged the validity of the asymmetric central banker preference hypothesis for this period. We used the 
interval of 1983:1–2007:2 as our Great Moderation period.7
Following Ruge-Murcia (2003) and others, we first perform neglected ARCH tests to check whether there 
is conditional volatility in the unemployment series. Table 1 shows the results of these tests for the three 
Table 1 LM tests for neglected ARCH.
Squared
residuals
Sample period No. of lags
1 2 3 4 5 6
Original 1960:1–2011:2 16.78* 23.84* 24.16* 24.45* 25.16* 25.72*
1960:1–1999:4 9.65* 15.15* 15.89* 16.21* 16.66* 17.17*
1983:1–2007:2 0.03 0.43 1.50 2.73 2.82 3.72
Standardized 1960:1–2011:2 0.00 0.17 0.75 1.59 5.06 5.75
1960:1–1999:4 0.03 0.70 1.03 2.10 4.36 6.30
Notes: The superscript * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of conditional homoskedasticity at the 5% and 10% 
significance levels. LM tests for neglected ARCH in the standardized squared residual were not reported for the Great 
Moderation period (1983:1–2007:2) because there is no evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity in the original squared 
residuals for this subsample.
5 In particular, this occurs when φt is the only time-varying parameter and follows the same AR(1) process as the one describing 
ct. This can be seen by looking at the first-order condition of the central bank’s optimization problem [see the first order equation 
on Ruge-Murcia (2003, p. 1380)] and the fact that φt, being a central bank preference parameter, belongs to the central bank’s 
information set.
6 Ball and Mazumder (2011) impose this type of restriction in the estimation of the slope of a backward-looking Phillips curve. 
Moreover, they impose that the Phillips curve slope follows a random walk process, whereas the coefficient associated with the 
conditional unemployment volatility is assumed to follow an AR(1) process in this paper.
7 The exact timing for the Great Moderation period is somewhat debatable. Regarding its beginning, surico (2007) suggests the 
fourth quarter of 1982 whereas smets and Wouters (2007) consider the first quarter of 1984. We choose a starting point between 
these two. We also choose the second quarter of 2007 as the end of the Great Moderation since after this date the rate of unemploy-
ment has shown a sharp positive increase. Currently the rate of unemployment is twice as big as it was in the second quarter of 
2007 and is about the same as those seen in the early 1980’s. That being said, the estimation results from the Great Moderation 
period are not sensitive to slight changes in its dating.
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sample periods using residuals of an ARMA(1,2) fit to the original unemployment series and then using the 
residuals of the standardized series which where created by running a first step GARCH(1,1) on unemploy-
ment with an AR(6) model for the mean equation. These test statistics have χ2(q) distribution where q is the 
number of lags. Focusing on the full sample results, we see that these neglected ARCH tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no conditional volatility for the original series and do not reject the null hypothesis of no con-
ditional volatility for the standardized series.
Because the conditional ARCH test results show evidence that unemployment over the full sample exhib-
its conditional heteroskedasticity, we now undertake an investigation of whether there might be asymmetric 
policy preferences. Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) considered two formulations for the natural rate of unem-
ployment process which lead to two slightly different reduced form specifications. In order to save space, 
we focus our attention on the nonstationary case, ARIMA(1,1,2).8 Table 2 presents estimates, for the whole 
sample period (1960:1–2011:2) for the Ruge-Murcia model and the time varying models for variance ratios of 
100 and 100,000. There were three differences between our estimation procedure and Ruge-Murcia’s, none of 
which impacted the results. First, we estimated the unemployment conditional variances using the same first 
step GARCH(1,1) model used to compute the standardized residuals described in the neglected ARCH tests.9 
second, our maximum likelihood estimates made use of the Kalman Filter which is well suited for estimating 
time variation in the parameters.10 And, third we constrained b to be greater or equal to zero. This constraint 
is necessary so that the Ruge-Mucia model is properly nested as a special case of the time varying parameter 
model and thus likelihood ratio statistics can be applied.11
Table 2 Sample 1960:1–2011:2 (number of observations: 206).
Coefficient Model
Ruge-Murcia
0 < k ≤  1
Time varying
k = 1, r = 100,000 k = 1, r = 100
a 3.0593 (0.2003) 3.0650 (0.2000) 3.2273 (0.1895)
b 0.0000 (–)
c or c 6.1857 (2.3425) 6.0313 (2.3381) 1.6090 (2.2067)
ρc 0.9769 (0.0023) 0.9773 (0.0036)
Mean log likelihood –2.3154 –2.3124 –2.2325
Notes to Tables 2–4: Forecasting unemployment using ARIMA(1,1,2). a is the intercept term, b is the coefficient of expected 
unemployment, c ( )c  is the (mean of the time-varying) coefficient of the conditional variance of unemployment, and ρc is the 
first-order autoregressive parameter of ct process. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The standard error of b is not reported in 
some cases because the lower-bound imposed by economic theory on b (i.e. b is non-negative) is binding in those cases.
8 The interested reader may check the working paper version of the paper, Cassou and Vázquez (2012), for a comparison of the 
estimation results under both the stationary and nonstationary specifications of the natural rate of unemployment process. The 
empirical results are robust across the two specifications and justifies our inclusion of only one here.
9 An advantage of estimating the conditional variance in a first step is that we use the whole sample to estimate it. This feature 
is important when we perform a sensitivity analysis across subsamples below. For instance, if the estimated conditional variance 
were estimated using data from the Great Moderation period, this estimated conditional variance is likely to be biased since it only 
considers data from a period which featured low volatility.
10 Of lesser note is that we also included 
pi
1
2
 in our likelihood function which Ruge-Murcia (2003) did not. so our likelihoods 
differ from his by this factor. This omission does not invalidate Ruge-Murcia’s likelihood ratio statistics because the missing factor 
in both likelihood values cancel.
11 As Table 2 shows, in the sample period from 1960:1 to 2011:2, this non-negativity constraint was binding. We did estimate the 
model without this constraint and the estimated value was –0.06 with a standard error of 0.10. Furthermore, the likelihood values 
are only different in the second decimal place. From these results, we conclude that the constraint is supported by the data.
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Column 1 shows the estimation results of the Ruge-Murcia model with no time variation. As in Ruge-
Murcia (2003), we cannot reject the null that H0:b = 0 for the two unemployment specifications considered. 
This result means that policy makers seem to target the natural rate of unemployment as suggested by Blinder 
(1998) and McCallum (1997), among others. since we cannot reject this null, the time-varying parameter 
models were estimated using this constraint. Columns 2 and 3 show the estimation results for two alternative 
values of the variance ratio, r. For large values of r (column 2 with r = 100,000), which implies a low variation 
of ct, the estimation results are quantitatively similar to those found in Ruge-Murcia model. Thus, parameter 
estimates, standard errors of estimates and model fit measured by the mean log likelihood are almost identi-
cal in the two versions. In contrast, column 3 shows that a relatively small variance of the shock affecting ct 
(i.e., r = 100) is enough to improve significantly the fit of the time varying model. Interestingly, the estimated 
value of c  is no longer significant. However, this result should not be interpreted as evidence against the 
asymmetric policy maker preference suggested by Ruge-Murcia (2003) since the time varying parameter, ct, 
is still tied to the conditional unemployment variance. This is an important feature to keep in mind in the 
discussion below. Moreover, the estimation results also show that ct is highly persistent for any value of r. A 
highly persistent ct is consistent with the idea of low frequency movements associated with both central bank 
preferences and the slope of the Phillips curve.
Because the time varying model nests the Ruge-Murcia model when ρc and the parameters characterizing 
the shock process of ct (i.e., wt) are all zero, the restrictions imposed by Ruge-Murcia’s model can be tested 
through a standard likelihood ratio (LR) test, which is distributed as a χ2(3).12 The LR statistic takes the value 
34.15, which imply that the restriction of a constant coefficient associated with the conditional unemploy-
ment volatility in the Ruge-Murcia model is rejected at any standard significance level.
As noted at the beginning of the section, we next undertake a sensitivity analysis by considering two 
alternative subsamples. First we will focus on the 1960:1–1999:4 subsample. Referring back to Table 1, note 
that the second row indicates the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity in the unemployment series as 
was documented by Ruge-Mucia (2003). Furthermore, the second row of the standardized neglected ARCH 
tests show that the GARCH(1,1) formulation produces a series whose residuals no longer exhibit ARCH behav-
ior which is again consistent with Ruge-Murcia (2003). Table 3 shows the estimation results for this subsam-
ple. Column 1 shows the results from estimation of the Ruge-Mucia model. It shows results similar to those 
reported in Ruge-Murcia (2003) using our slightly different estimation algorithm. In particular, the estimate 
of b is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the central banker indeed targeted the natural 
rate of unemployment, and the estimate of c is positive and significant, which supports the main hypothesis 
suggested in Ruge-Murcia (2003) that the us Federal Reserve cares more heavily about positive than negative 
unemployment deviations from the natural rate.
12 The characterization of wt requires three additional parameters describing the variance of the Choleski decomposition together 
with ρc. But because the restriction imposed by the ratio of variances, r, there are only three more parameters in the time variation 
model than in the Ruge-Murcia model.
Table 3 Sample 1960:1–1999:4 (number of observations: 160).
Coefficient Model
Ruge-Murcia 
0 < k ≤  1
Time varying
k = 1, r = 100,000 k = 1, r = 100
a 2.6972 (0.6790) 3.2326 (0.2317) 3.3309 (0.2253)
b 0.1030 (0.1274)
c or c 7.4892 (2.8490) 8.4740 (2.2414) 4.5748 (2.3213)
ρc 0.9644 (0.0070) 0.9664 (0.0078)
Mean log likelihood –2.3165 –2.3162 –2.2682
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Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 show the estimation results for the time varying model for the two alternative 
values of the variance ratio, r. These results are similar to those found for the whole sample. In particular, for 
a large value of r, the results replicate the results obtained in the constant coefficient model and as r becomes 
smaller, the model fit improves and the mean of the time varying coefficient, ,c  becomes insignificant. The 
LR statistic takes the value 15.46. This once again gives support for the time varying coefficient specification 
suggested in this paper.
Next consider the Great Moderation subsample. Referring back to Table 1, we see that row 3 of the original 
series tests show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. In other words, unem-
ployment appears to not exhibit conditional volatility during this period.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for this subsample. Looking at Column 1, and comparing the esti-
mation results reported here with those in the previous tables, we observe that the estimation results for the 
Great Moderation period stand in sharp contrast with those found for the whole sample and the 1960:1–1999:4 
subsample analyzed by Ruge-Murcia (2003). In particular, the parameter b becomes significantly different 
from zero as if the Fed was targeting an unemployment level below the natural rate of unemployment during 
this period. More importantly, the conditional unemployment volatility coefficient is close to zero and non-
significant. These estimation results are consistent with those reported by surico (2007), who uses a differ-
ent model and a different econometric approach. surico (2007) interprets his results as evidence against the 
asymmetric central banker hypothesis during the Great Moderation period.
We have an alternative interpretation. The coefficient of the conditional unemployment volatility could 
be nonsignificant during the Great Moderation period because unemployment volatility, as noted in Table 
1, was much smaller during this period than before it. so, even if central bank preferences were asymmetric 
during this period, the central banker did not need to take much action against positive deviations of unem-
ployment from the target because these positive deviations were few and small. This means that it is hard 
to identify the parameter characterizing asymmetric preferences (coefficient c in Ruge-Murcia’s model) in a 
context were deviations of unemployment from the natural rate of unemployment are small. To study this 
possibility, our time varying model is quite well suited because it allows for the possibility for changes in the 
non-linear inflation bias function characterized by asymmetric central banker preferences.
Columns 2–4 show the estimation results for the two values of the variance ratio previously considered 
and a new one, r = 1, respectively. We consider this additional r value here for two main reasons. First, the 
model fit significantly improves. second, this value seems reasonable since the inflation shock volatility has 
substantially decreased during the Great Moderation which would be consistent with a smaller variation 
ratio as long as the size of shocks hitting the time varying coefficient has remained constant or has decreased 
much less than the size of inflation shocks.
Notice that the model fit of Ruge-Murcia’s model, which for this period does not show evidence of asym-
metric central banker preferences, is almost identical to the time varying model when r = 100. These results 
imply that the interpretation of surico (2007) of symmetric preferences and the time varying coefficient model 
suggested in this paper are somewhat observational equivalent. However, two qualifications seem to be in 
order. First, the interpretation of surico (2007) on this framework leads to a positive, significant estimate of 
Table 4 Sample 1983:1–2007:2 (number of observations: 98).
Coefficient Model
Ruge-Murcia 
0 < k ≤  1
Time varying
k = 1, r = 100,000 k = 1, r = 100 k = 1, r = 1
a 1.5983 (0.4621) 2.3844 (0.1635) 2.4109 (0.1669) 2.5862 (0.1978)
b 0.1652 (0.0842)
c or c 0.2978 (2.8816) 3.7232 (2.7134) 3.3644 (2.6925) 0.6390 (2.7521)
ρc 0.9469 (0.0125) 0.9482 (0.0133) 0.9480 (0.0155)
Mean log likelihood –1.0275 –1.0348 –1.0215 –0.9310
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coefficient b, which implies that the Fed targets an unemployment rate lower than the natural rate and this 
feature had been questioned by several authors [McCallum (1997) and Blinder (1998) among others]. second, 
the time varying specification of asymmetric preferences has the attractive property of being consistent across 
different samples. This can be seen by comparing the parameter estimates for the k = 1, r = 100 models across 
Tables 1–3. Moreover, if one is ready to accept that the ratio of variance r is much smaller during the Great 
Moderation than before, the model fit of the time varying model improves significantly. This can be seen in 
the LR statistic associated with the null hypothesis of a constant value for c which takes the value 18.91.13
4  Conclusions
This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model. A time 
varying coefficient associated with the conditional unemployment volatility is motivated through several 
means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve and/or variation in the preferences of the mon-
etary authority. The estimation results show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemploy-
ment volatility parameter in the reduced-form of the model improves the model fit and it helps to provide 
an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across 
subsamples.
The contribution of this paper can be understood as an example in which parameter instability is an 
important issue in the data and one which affects the economic conclusions of models.
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